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Critique of Hayek's Liberalism and the Rule of Law
Kacper Mykietyn
University of Toronto
Introduction
Andrew Farrant and Edward McPhail note that in 2010 under Obama’s
administration the popularity of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom dramatically spiked
(Farrant and McPhail 2010). As a result of this increased level of attention, the
University of Chicago Press had to order an additional 100,000 copies (Farrant and
McPhail 2010 2010, 79). Despite the renewed popularity of Hayekian liberalism, I
use this essay to raise a few doubts about its adequacy in the twenty-first century.
In this paper, I argue that Hayek’s theory, with its emphasis on the rule of law,
should not serve as a reference point because it ignores the oppression experienced
by the less privileged and fails to provide a satisfactory definition of freedom. I
unfold this thesis in three stages.
I begin my argument by noting how the government under the rule of law
is not morally neutral as Hayek claims, but, on the contrary, takes a stance by
ignoring the harms that minorities have experienced in the past. Secondly, I argue
that by being concerned only with the rules of the system and not its outcomes
(sometimes referred to as procedural liberalism), Hayekian liberalism underplays
the way in which capitalists exploit the working class. Lastly, I will build on the
work of Yildiz Silier to argue that prior arguments notwithstanding, Hayek’s
liberalism should still not be promoted, because of its distorted definition of
freedom, which fails to recognize that one’s liberty can be restricted by factors that
are not reducible to individual behaviour.
The Rule of Law and Minorities
When Hayek writes about the rule of law, he does not have in mind any
particular laws constituted by legislators. The rule of law does not consist of
anyone’s policies. Instead, it constitutes what Hayek calls a meta-legal principle; in
other words, the rule of law should be understood as an ideal that is objective and
unchangeable. Such rules, says Hayek, must be concerned with protecting the
liberty of the individual. As he puts it, “the conception of freedom under the law
[...] rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract
rules laid down irrespective of their appflication to us, we are not subject to another
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man’s will and are therefore free” (Hayek 1960, 153). In other words, to secure
freedom, Hayek’s liberalism says that individuals should be left alone to make their
own decisions by following the rules that apply to all of them equally. The rules do
not give us guides to what we ought to do, but instead form constraints on the
permissible manifestations of the actions we choose.
In practice, Hayek’s belief in individual freedom manifests itself primarily
as skepticism towards governmental intervention. For example, he argues that the
government has no right in determining what commodities can be sold or for what
price they ought to be sold (Hayek 1960). Such restriction on government action
might result in, or enshrine existing, inequalities. However, Hayek argues that most
inequalities are justified, assuming that they result from the free actions of
individuals—by which he means primarily individual agents interacting in markets.
An intervention aiming at particular individuals is, according to Hayek, a
characteristic of totalitarian regimes, that attempt to weaponize the law (Hayek
1944). Such actions are unacceptable in Hayek’s liberalism because they result from
rules designed to be partial, rather than applied neutrally to all citizens.
Finally, Hayek sees the rule of law as restricting the actions of the
government in such a way so that they are predictable. For free individuals to make
reasonable choices, they cannot live under the impression that the government may
at any moment make capricious changes in public policy. Put differently, by
intervening in the free market the government changes the rules of the game, so to
speak, thereby making it difficult for people to make rational plans (especially
economic decisions) in the most efficient manner possible. Intervention breeds
inefficiency. In short, Hayek’s idea of rule of law liberalism treats persons as
autonomous entities and does not interfere with their freedom.
Sometimes it is claimed that Hayek’s philosophy is not driven by ignorance
but rather, skepticism towards a central authority attempting to shape policy on the
basis of morality. Hayek opposes government intervention since for the
government to fight for the rights of a certain group means to become a “moral
institution” (Hayek 2001); the government under to rule of law, however, ought to
be “amoral” (Hayek 2001) because “planning necessarily involves deliberate
discrimination between particular needs of different people” (Hayek 2001, 82).
Simply put, by advocating for one group’s interests the government will necessarily
have to act against the interest of some other group. Hayek’s liberalism does not
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attempt to choose which group deserves certain goods and which does not since
such a decision would be purely arbitrary and not based on a desert. Thus, the rule
of law aims to prevent the government from taking any moral position beyond
barebones proceduralism.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that Hayek’s rejection of a
“moral” government is only illusory. I claim that by not taking an action the
government does not remain amoral. Indeed, in doing so within a given historical
context, like that of the U.S. it makes substantive ethical commitments, namely that
minorities do not deserve any reparations. Consequently, rather than allowing the
government to support minority groups, the government in Hayek’s society treats
them as individuals fully responsible for their fate. More progressive theorists have
pointed out that such reasoning implies “political solipsism” that is, “the [idea] that
human individuals are essentially self-sufficient entities" (Jaggar 1983, 40; see also
McKinnon 1989; Young 1990) In other words, what liberal philosophy fails to
recognize is that the person’s achievement and success are (at least in some part)
due to the social setting in which they find themselves; likewise, socio-economic
inequalities are not just a result of individuals making their own independent
choices. For example, my success in school is not merely my own individual
achievement. To be the effective student that I am, I had to be shaped by various
educators and instructors throughout my life. If I had been educated by different
teachers in a completely different social context, the student, and ultimately more
generally the person, who I am may be significantly different. The results of this
sharply individualist (or what is sometimes referred to as atomistic) conception of
human beings are not merely theoretical but lead to practical consequences.
According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission (2020), in 2020
the unemployment rate for people of colour was 12.9 % higher than for White
people. Moreover, Black workers with degrees earned about 23% less than White
workers with the same education status. When confronted with such data, liberals
uphold that it is just an outcome of individual choice. They ignore that the socioeconomic position of people of colour should be understood through the lenses of
the history of racial segregation and the fact that racial minorities only recently got
access to education, employment, healthcare, etc. Simply accepting rule of law
liberalism is, therefore, not to take a position somehow outside of morality. On the
contrary, a person who accepts Hayek’s liberalism clearly takes a moral stance by
first rejecting the serious harm experienced by minorities and second asking the
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oppressed ones to compete on unequal terms with the more privileged members
of society.
The Rule of Law and its Ignorance of Exploitation
Secondly, Hayek’s liberalism should not be defended since by implying that
the government should be concerned only with the rules and not the outcomes of
economic transactions, it ignores the problem of exploitation that the working class
faces on an everyday basis. As mentioned above, according to Hayek’s liberalism
the government cannot direct the means of production towards “particular ends”
(Hayek 2001). Rather than paying attention to outcomes, the government should
be concerned only with “the conditions under which the available resources may
be used” (Hayek 2001, 86).
To put this in the language of contemporary moral philosophy, Hayek’s rule
of law rejects moral consequentialism in favor of some form of moral deontology—i.e.,
actions are themselves wrong or right regardless of their consequences. If person
A voluntarily agrees to work for person B, so the argument goes, then the
government has no right to intervene. That is considered a free and fair decision
made between autonomous individuals, so even if the outcome is disastrous for
one party, the government cannot justifiably intervene. However, when one is
concerned only with the procedural validity of the transaction and not at all
concerned with its consequences, then one also underplays the exploitation that is
inherently part of that system. The philosophic argument for the above assertion
was perhaps best articulated by the 19th-century German economist, social
theorist, and philosopher, Karl Marx.
He pointed out that if a worker is hired for, for instance, $16 an hour, it
means that for every hour they work, they also create a new value, that is, surplus
value since it goes beyond the cost of production (Marx, 1998, 158-177). The
surplus value obviously does not belong to the worker but becomes acquired by
the capitalist who may use it to reinvest in the machinery (as some pro-capitalist
thinkers would argue) or keep it for themselves. If not for the surplus value, the
capitalist would have no rational reason to hire the worker at all. Marx’s argument
is essentially that we can think of a worker’s day as divided into two stages. In the
first stage, the workers produce that value necessary to cover their own wages,
whereas in the second stage, the worker works to bring profit to the capitalist. Marx
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concludes that during the second part of the day the worker works essentially for
free (Zwolinski and Wertheimer 2016; see also Marx 1847).
In Hayek’s rule of law liberalism, the government has no legitimate claim
to intervene in the transaction between employers and employees since both sides
voluntarily agree to the described above transaction in which one side is exploited.
‘Voluntarily’ here means for “one’s own purpose” and not because of someone
else’s will (Hayek 1960). If a such voluntary transaction is not itself morally wrong
then its outcomes, namely, the exploitation of the worker can be ignored. I sustain
that insofar as we think that workers should be compensated for all the work they
do, rather than exploited, Hayek’s liberalism is problematic. If the theory is
concerned only with the actions of capitalists, that is, with whether they follow the
rules, but refuse to investigate the harmful consequences of such actions, then it
seems clear that such theory is not adequate to address today's capitalist system and
its problems.
The Rule of Law and its Flawed Definition of Freedom
Thirdly, I think that the rule of law should be of interest to us only as a
historical artifact rather than an active doctrine because of its parochial definition
of freedom. Hayek’s liberalism understands freedom only in a negative sense
(Berlin 2017), i.e., as the freedom to be left alone from external intrusion on one’s
activity,1 and as independent of one’s economic status. As he puts it, individuals are
only free when they “are not subject to another man's will” (Hayek 1960, 153). In
other words, one is free when one is not subject to the coercion of another party.
Note that this understanding of freedom pays no regard to one’s class position.
As Hayek remarks in the Constitution of Liberty, “though freedom and wealth
are both good things [...] they still remain different. [...] The courtier living in the
lap of luxury but at the beck and call of his prince may be much less free than a
poor peasant or artisan, less able to live his own life and to choose his own
opportunities for usefulness” (Hayek 2011, 68). The reason that a peasant might be
freer from a courtier is precisely the lack of restriction and coercion from another
subject, in this case, a prince. The courtier enjoys a way more luxurious life;
It is also worth mentioning that the Rule of Law assures only that one is free from the
restrictions and force of some third party. It is not, however, concerned with freedom in a
positive sense; for example, freedom to free health care or good quality higher education.
1
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however, he is not free because he is subject to the whims of his prince. The
peasant, on the other hand, might be less wealthy but is not directly subject to the
will of another person. Hence, Hayek concludes that the right understanding of
freedom indicates that one’s liberty is independent of economic status.
But this way of thinking about freedom obscures how one’s class status
actually works to constrain one’s freedom. As Yildiz Silier (2005) explains “selfdetermination” (Hayek’s negative freedom) is just one aspect of true human
freedom. What must also be considered, Silier argues, is “the power to achieve selfdetermination” (Silier 2005). In other words, one must have the actual means and
beings to make use of the fact that one is not subject to the will of another. So, it
might be true that the peasant is not directly subject to the whims of a prince, like
the courtier, but they are subject to the need to pay their bills and satisfy a whole
host of external needs. Economic scarcity, or worse deprivation, makes the
apparent freedom they have much more circumscribed. Hence, as Silier notes,
Hayek’s example fails since the courtier has freely chosen their lifestyle; if they wish
they can quit their job and become free in the same sense as the peasant.
Hayek struggles to account for the way that one’s economic status can alter
one’s level of freedom because he only recognized being subject to the will of other
specific individuals as a restriction on freedom. Hence, being subject to things like
the market or market logic in an abstract sense does not constitute for him any
restrictions on freedom. Yet, as a matter of lived experience, we often find our
freedom constrained by both. One’s freedom is evidently (and often) limited by
socio-economic factors, for example, poverty in which case lack of restriction from
other individuals becomes meaningless. To use Silier’s example, both the poor and
the rich have a right to hire a lawyer; however, if the poor do not have money to
pay for a lawyer, then their right to have one becomes meaningless (Silier 2005).
Thus, the conception of freedom upon which the rule of law is predicated upon is
limited. To be helpful, it needs to be integrated with other conceptions of freedom
that do more to recognize the way that social processes, and not just individual
actions and behaviours, can limit one’s freedom.
Conclusion
This paper has offered three critiques of Hayek’s rule of law liberalism.
Taken together, they show that his theory should not be invoked in the twenty-first
century. First, the rule of law fails to take an amoral position that it aims to achieve
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since advocating for the free-market economy and minimal government
intervention represent a very clear ethical position that stands in opposition to the
demand of the minorities. Second, being concerned only with the rules of the game
but not its result, Hayek ignores the exploitation of those who do not own the
means of production. Finally, I argued that Hayek’s liberalism operates with an
insufficient definition of freedom which ignores socio-economic factors that can
also serve as a form of coercion. Hayek’s rule of law liberalism is an important
aspect of any free society. However, its reliance on pure proceduralism, rather than
being sensitive to unfair differential outcomes, suggests that it alone cannot be the
theoretical underpinning of contemporary democratic societies
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